

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 DHAHRA 00303 251323 Z

43

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AID-20 OMB-01 SR-02 ORM-03 EA-11

CIAE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03

RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12 IO-12 RSR-01 /129 W
----- 027968

R R 251130 Z APR 73

FM AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3380

INFO DOD WASHDC

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERNANY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

USMTM DHAHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L DHAHRAN 0303

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINS, SA

FROM CHARGE

CINCEUR FOR POLAD; DOD FOR ISA

SUBJECT: KING FAISAL CALLS FOR EARLY SOLUTION TO ARAB-
ISRAELI PROBLEM

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: DURING HOUR' S AUDIENCE APRIL 24
KING FAISAL STRESSED TO CINCEUR GEN GOODPASTER NEED FOR
EARLY US ACTION TO RESOLVE ARAB- ISRAELI DISPUTE. PENDING
SUCH A SOLUTION, SAG EMBARRASSED BY ATTACKS FROM SOME OF

ITS NEIGHBORS THAT IT A LACKEY OF AMERICANS. GENERAL
REFERRED TO US EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF SETTLEMENT AND AFFIRMED
THESE WOULD CONTINUE. AT SAME TIME HE FELT IT ESSENTIAL
FOR STABILITY OF ENTIRE REGION THAT USG, SAG, AND OTHER
FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE TO INCREASE THEIR COOPERATION.
KING TOOK CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN HIS GUEST AND SPOKE IN
MORE DIRECT AND PERSONAL MANNER THAN USUAL. END SUMMARY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DHAHRA 00303 251323 Z

1. AT BEGINNING OF AUDIENCE WITH KING FAISAL APRIL 24
(ATTENDED ALSO BY CHARGE HORAN, POLAD LONG, AND CHUSMTM
SMITH) GENERAL GOODPASTER REMARKED HAVING PREVIOUSLY MET
HM IN 1957 WHEN HE VISITED US AS SAUDI ARABIA' PRIME
MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, HE ADDED,
HAD DEEN
MOST IMPRESSED BY HM' S POLITICAL JUDGMENT
AND PARTICULARLY BY HIS KNOWLEDGE OF HUMAN NATURE. KING
NOTED WITH PLEASURE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER' S HONORABLE AND
COURAGEOUS STAND IN 1956 DURING ANGLO- FRENCH- ISRAELI
ATTACK UPON CANAL AND SINAI. HE ADDED THAT SAG PLACED
GREAT STORE BY ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH UNITED STATES, AND HOPED
THAT THIS FRIENDSHIP WOULD GROW EVER MORE STRONG IN YEARS
TO COME.

2. AT SAME TIME KING URGED THAT US TAKE NOTE OF THREAT THAT
ZIONISM AND COMMUNISM POSED TO PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST AND EVEN
TO STABILILY AND INTEGRITY OF US SOCIETY ITSELF.

3. GENERAL GOODPASTER REPLIED THAT US HAD DONE A GREAT DEAL
IN FURTHERING CAUSE OF PEACE IN ME, AND SPECIFICALLY
MENTIONED CEASEFIRE OF AUGUST 1970 AS HAVING HELPED ABATE
TENSIONS IN AREA AND MAKE POSSIBLE EFFORTS TOWARD A
PERMANENT AND SLABLE PEACE-- WHICH REMAINS OUR GOAL IN ME.

4. KING STRONGLY AGREED THAT SUCH A PEACE SHOULD BE OBJECT
OF INTENSE US EFFORTS. HE COMPLAINED THAT UNDER PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES, SOME OF SAUDI ARABIA' S NEIGHBORS WERE ACCUSING
IT OF BEING AGENT OR LACKEY OF US IMPERIALISM. THESE AC-
CUSATIONS WERE A SOURCE OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN AND EMBARASS-
MENT TO SAG AND HE URGED THAT US RESOLVE THE CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT GAVE THEM RISE . SAG DID NOT EXPECT US TO TAKE MILITARY
ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL, BUT WHY, KING ASKED, DID US NOT STEP
BACK FROM ISRAEL (AS WEHAD DONE IN VIET- NAM) AND ALLOW OUR
FORMER CLIENT TO STAND ON OWN TWO FEET. LET UNITED STATES
ABANDON ISRAEL, HE URGED. FURTHERMORE, IF ISRAEL WOULD ONLY
AGREE TO WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TO TAKE
BACK PALESTINIAN REFUGEES EXPELLED IN 1 948, SOLUTIONS TO
ALL OTHER OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN TWO SIDES WOULD FALL
INTO PLACE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 DHAHRA 00303 251323 Z

5. GENERAL GOODPASTER REMARKED THAT ARAB- ISRAELI QUESTION
COMPLEX ONE THAT HAD ITS ORIGINS IN CIRCUMSTANCES PRECEDING
OUR PRESENT INVOLVEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST. PROBLEM REQUIRED
AND WOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE CONTINUED US EFFORTS TO FIND
A SOLUTION. AFTER ALL IN THIS INSTANCE US WAS AFFECTED
BY THE " BURDENS OF HISTORY". GENERAL ALSO EMPHASIZED IT WAS
ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA AND

REGION AS A WHOLE, THAT COOPERATION ON MILITARY AND OTHER
LEVELS BETWEEN SAG, USG, AND OTHER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS
OF AREA SHOULD CONTINUE AND GROW. KING TOO, BELIEVED THISTO
BE TRUE, ALTHOUGHHE URGED REPEATEDLY THAT A HIGHER PRIORITY
BE GIVEN TO SOLVING THE ARAB- ISRAELI PROBLEM FOR

THE SAKE OF SAUDI ARABIA' S INTERESTS AS WELL AS THOSE
OF US.

BAHTI

CONFIDENTIAL
NMAFVVZCZ

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts:
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 25 APR 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973DHAHRA00303
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: DHAHRAN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730453/aaaaiycw.tel
Line Count: 126
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 JAN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07-Jan-2002 by martinjw>; APPROVED <23-Jan-2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> jms 980203
Subject: KING FAISAL CALLS FOR EARLY SOLUTION TO ARAB- ISRAELI PROBLEM
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, SA
To: DOD WASHDC
JIDDA
NEA
SECSTATE WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERNANY
USMTM DHAHRAN
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005